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This paper explores the link between the measurement of intergenerational mobility and the
notion of equality of opportunity. We show how recently proposed theories of equality of
opportunity can be meaningfully adapted to the intergenerational context. This throws a new
light on the interpretation of existing mobility measures: these may be interesting to measure
mobility as movement, but they are inadequate to capture the notion of equality of opportunity.
We propose some new mobility measures, which start from the idea that the intergenerational
transition matrix gives usefulinformation about theopportunity sets of the children of different
social classes. These measures are used in an empirical illustration to evaluate the degree of
inequality of opportunity in the US, Great Britain and Italy.
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1 Introduction
One of the most obvious applications of the idea of "equality of opportunity" is in an
intergenerational context. The feeling is widespread that income inequalities which arise from
differences at birth are a sign of unequal opportunity and should definitely be a cause of ethical
concern. There is less consensus about the desirability of further government policy to reduce
inequality in outcomes, due to other factors
1. Such a concern for equality of opportunity is
apparentlyoneofthemainreasons tobeinterestedin intergenerationalmobility:ourimmediate
intuitions suggest that more intergenerational mobility means more equal opportunities. There
may be other reasons to be interested in mobility (see, e.g., Atkinson, 1981). Mobility may be
an objective in its own right. Or it may be instrumental in leading to greater efficiency. Or
(Atkinson’sown proposal) it mayinfluence the overall level of social welfare, defined over the
distribution of income for different generations. But, although all these other reasons mayplay
arole,therewillalmostalwaysbealinkwithconcernforequalityofopportunityamongchildren
from different income classes.
Since intergenerational mobility is an old concern in both sociology and economics, various
statisticalandnormativemeasureshavebeenproposedintheliterature. Theaxiomaticproperties
of these measures have been investigated by Shorrocks (1978, 1993). He shows that there are
fundamentalincompatibilitiesbetweenatfirstsightquitereasonableaxioms. Theseaxiomscan
be related to the different reasons for being interested in intergenerational mobility mentioned
before.
1 Two recent revealing quotes -among many which could be given- are the following: "I am going to take the
position that if economic success is largely unpredictable on the basis of observed aspects of family background,
than we can reasonably claim that society provides equal opportunity. There might still be significant inequality
in income across individuals, due to differences in ability, hard work, luck, and so on, but I will call these unequal
outcomes. On the other hand, if economic success is highly predictable on the basis of family background, then I
think it is difficult to accept the claim that our society provides equal opportunity" (Stokey, 1996, 2). And: "If the
industrious and talented have much higher incomes than the work-shy and stupid, then not only might we not be
worried about inequality between them, but also such inequality as there is might be considered a positive good.
If,on theotherhand, inequality arisesfromchance ofbirth-if one’sincome isvirtuallydetermined by thatofone’s
parents-thenanunequaldistributionmightbeacauseofseriousconcern"(JohnsonandReed,1996). Bothcitations
are revealing in that they do not rank "ability" and "talent" among the factors to be compensated for. This is of
course debatable.-2-
Withthispaperwewantto explorethelinkbetweenthemeasurementof equalityofopportunity
and intergenerational mobility. In section 2 we discuss how recently developed theories of
equality of opportunity (Bossert, 1995; Bossert et al., 1996; Fleurbaey, 1995a, 1995b; Roemer,
1993, 1996) can be interpreted in an intergenerational context and we point to some basic
normative choices which have to be made. Either oneconcentrates on theoverall evaluation of
the opportunities of children from different descent or one tries to realise equal outcomes for
all children who exert the same effort. Both intuitions are basically incompatible. In section 3
we discuss the existing mobility measures based on transition matrices and we will point out
therelationshipbetween differentaxiomsanddifferentmotivationsto beinterestedin mobility.
It will turn out that none of the existing measures captures adequately the basic intuitions of
equalityofopportunity. In section 4 weshow howthealternativemeasures proposedin section
2 can be interpreted and applied for the analysis of transition matrices. We also present an
empirical illustration. Section 5 concludes.
2 Equality of opportunities in an intergenerational context
It is common in the analysis of intergenerational mobility to concentrate on the two-period (or
two-generations)caseandtorepresenttheeconomicstatusofallindividualsbyascalarmeasure,
i.e. to neglect all aspects of life-time mobility. The basic material for the empirical analysis
then consists of |N| parent-child pairs, with the respective income levels:
. Starting from the overall vector of incomes of two generations
,onethendividestheincomevectorsforparentsandchildren
in n equally-sized quantiles and one constructs the (nxn) bistochastic matrix P, where is the
proportion of children with a parent income in quantile i who themselves have an income in














2. We will return to the evaluation of such matrices in the next section. In this section
we will concentrate on the evaluation of the basic income vector from the point of view of
equality of opportunity.
The crucial feature of the various theories of "equal opportunities" is the way in which they
distinguish "opportunities" and "outcomes". Recent theories (the most prominent economic
examples being Roemer, 1996, Bossert, 1995, andFleurbaey, 1995a, 1995b) draw adistinction
betweentwosets ofvariables:ontheonehandvariables forwhichtheindividual(inourcontext
the child) cannot be held responsible, on the other hand variables for which she is responsible.
Thebasicideaisto compensatefordifferencesinoutcomes resultingfromtheformervariables,
buttoleaveintactoutcomedifferencesresulting fromthelattervariables. Roemer(1993,1996)
describes a specific procedure to implement this distinction. He proposes to partition the
population in groups which are homogeneous w.r.t. the non-responsibility characteristics. All
individuals in the same group are said to be of the same "type". By definition, within each type
thedifferencesinoutcomescanthenbeascribedtodifferencesinfactorsforwhichtheindividuals
areresponsible. Veryoften theseresponsibilityvariablesarebasically unobservable(e.g.effort
level). Roemer formulates a concrete proposal to overcome this difficulty. He assumes that
(within types) the individual outcome is a monotonically increasing function of an
(unobservable) "effort"-variable z. Two people of different types are said to have exercised the
same degree of responsibility if they are at the same percentile of the distribution of outcomes
for their type.
It is straightforward to translate these ideas to the intergenerational setting. We concentrate on
the situation of the children and we assume that their "type" is defined by the income of their
parent. If we suppose that there are n levels of parental income, we will have n different types.
Suppose that there are m children associated with each level of parental income, i.e. nm=|N|.
˜ y
2 In theoretical work, and more specifically in the analysis of Markov-chains, the basic concept is an analogous
transition matrix but instead of quantiles one works with a (fixed) vector of n income levels (with
). An element in P then gives the probability that a parent with an income has a child with
an income .
[y1,¼,yn]
y1<y2<¼<y n p ij yi
yj-4-
Intheterminologyofthetheoriesofequalityofopportunity,wenowhaventypesandmdegrees
of responsibility. It is convenient for our purposes to summarize the information which this




following from differences in natural abilities (not captured by the differences in parent’s
incomes) are treated here as within the children’s responsibility. As noted before, this is
extremely debatable from a broader philosophical point of view. Yet, although the
one-dimensional case can easily be generalised to a setting where the types are defined on the
basis of parent’s income plus other variables, this broader framework would require us to go
beyond the information which is traditionally summarized in transition matrices. The first
purpose of this paper is the evaluation of such matrices. Note indeed the close relationship
betweenYandthetransitionmatricesP:ifwedefinenquantilesofchildren’sincomes,thelatter
(nxn)-matrix can be immediately derived from the former (nxm)-matrix. This analogy will be
exploited later on.
For simplicity, we will assume that the ordering of matrices Y on the basis of the degree of
equality of opportunities can be represented by a function . It seems reasonable to impose










































































3 It iseasy to adapt theframework to thecase ofa different number ofchildren in each row: we then simply follow
Roemers’s percentile approach.-5-
WRI (Weak Responsiveness)
Let and be such that . Then
.
SRI (Strong Responsiveness)
Let and be such that . Then
.
Let us now turn to the interpretation of the equality of opportunity-concept. For each type t,
t=1,...,n, we can say that the corresponding row of the matrix Y, i.e. the vector
describes the opportunities of type t. For each degree of responsibility
, =1,...,m, we can consider the column . This vector describes the
outcomes for different types at the same level of responsibility. All this suggests that there are
twoalternativewaystostructure theevaluationfunction ,summarizedinthefollowingtwo
axioms:
SER (Separability over Responsibility):
SET (Separability over Types):
These separability assumptions can be related to two basic intuitions concerning equality of
opportunity. ThefirstismadeexplicitintheproposalofRoemer(1996). Lookatalltheelements
inonecolumnofY:thesegivetheincomelevelsreachedby childrenofdifferenttypes(different
parent’s incomes) but who exert the same effort level. From the point of view of equal
opportunities,itseemsnatural topreferasituationin whichthosewhoexercisedthesame effort
level receive the same outcome and this completely independent of the income of their parents.
Given SER, this basic idea is translated in the following axiom which says that a more equal
distribution of outcomes for children at the same effort level is to be preferred
4:
Y ˜ Y˜ y i ( j ) = y i ( j ) " i ( j )¹k( l) ˜ y k( l)=y k( l)+e ( e>0)
S[˜ Y]³S[ Y]
Y ˜ Y˜ y i ( j ) = y i ( j ) " i ( j )¹k( l) ˜ y k( l)=y k( l)+e ( e>0)
S[˜ Y]>S[ Y]
y t(.) =[y t( 1 )¼y t(r)¼yt(m)]
rr y .(r) =[y 1 (r)¼yt(r)¼yn(r)]
S[Y]
S[Y]=F[ u 1[y .(1)],u2[y.(2)],¼,um[y.(m)]]
S[Y]=G[ v 1[y 1 (.)],v2[y2(.)],¼,vn[yn(.)]]
4 We will formulate the basic insights of equality of opportunity in terms of strong axioms. The weak analogues
can immediately be formulated and lead to obvious changes in the following theorems.-6-
IAWR (Inequality Aversion within Degree of Responsibility)
Assume SER. Let and be such that
This axiom basically is a Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom, where the domain of is restricted by
the condition that the transfer should not change the rank order in the different rows.
There is a second intuition concerning equal opportunities, however. Take each row as a
description of the opportunity set of the corresponding type: the incomes which children of a
given parental income class can reach by varying their level of effort (for which they are
responsible). Assuming SET, these opportunities are evaluated by the functions . To
avoidunneccessarycomplications,weassumethatthesefunctionsaremeasurableonanabsolute
scale and hence are fully comparable over the different types. Moreover they are strictly
monotone and unbounded above and below. The idea that we prefer a more equal distribution
of opportunities can then be represented by the following axiom:
IABT (Inequality Aversion Between Types)
Assume SET. Let and be such that
AxiomIABT is againakind of transfer principle,statingthat a "redistributionof opportunities"
is positively valued. It entails a comparison between the rows of the matrix Y.
At first sight both these approaches are plausible and capture obvious intuitions. Yet it is easy
to see that they are incompatible. According to IAWR any redistribution of income from rich
to poor within a column must be positively evaluated, even if (when we consider the rows) the
Y ˜ Y
ui[˜ y.(i)]=u i[y .(i)]" i ¹r ,˜ yj(r) = yj(r) "j ¹ k,l
˜ y k(r) = yk(r) +e ,˜ yl(r) = yl(r)-e ( e>0), ˜ yk(r) £ ˜ y l(r), ˜ y k(r + 1) ³ ˜ y k(r), ˜ y l(r) ³ ˜ y l(r - 1)




v t[˜ yt(.)]=v t[y t(.)]" t ¹ k , l ,
v k [ ˜ y k (.)]=v k[y k(.)]+e ,v l[˜ yl(.)]=v l[y l(.)]-e ,e>0
v k[˜ yk(.)]£v l[˜ y l(.)]
Þ S[˜ Y]>S[ Y]-7-
redistribution goes from a low opportunities-type to a high opportunities-type. The basic
dilemma we face is illustrated in Figure 1, where the effort-level z is put on the horizontal axis
andtheoutcomeontheverticalaxis. Eachgraphrepresentstheopportunitiesofadifferenttype.
In the upper part of the figure children of type (social class) j will reach a higher income for all
effort levels but the lowest ones. According to IAWR a change in both the opportunities of the
typesiandjin thedirection ofthedotted linewill beanimprovement:thisgoesstrongly against
the intuition of IABT, because after that change the opportunities of children of type i are
(weakly) dominated by the opportunities of children of type j at all effort levels. On the other
hand, in the lower part of the figure the opportunities of type j-children are worse, except for
the very high effort levels and at these levels there is indeed a very unequal treatment of the
different types. According to IABT a further increase in this inequality (improving the
opportunities of type j-children) is positively evaluated. Of course, this is not so for IAWR.
Figure 1 about here
The consequences for the specification of are shown clearly in the following theorem,
which can be proven by application of standard results:
Theorem 1. (a) satisfies WRI, SET and IABT if and only if it can be written as
, where is non-decreasing in its arguments
and constant sum strictly quasi-concave, while is non-decreasing.
(b) satisfies WRI, SER and IAWR if and only if it can be written as
, where is non-decreasing in its arguments,
while is non-decreasing and constant sum strictly quasi-concave.
Weare really ata crossroadshere. Eitherwe look at thedifferentoutcomes within onecolumn,
or we concentrate on the evaluation of the different rows. As mentioned already, the first road
S[Y]
S[Y]
S[Y]=G[ v 1[y 1 (.)],v2[y2(.)],¼,vn[yn(.)]] G[.]
vk[.]
S[Y]
S[Y]=F[ u 1[y .(1)],u2[y.(2)],¼,um[y.(m)]] F[.]
ur[y.(r)]-8-
has been taken by Roemer (1996). The second road was first described in Van de gaer (1993)
and further discussed in Bossert et al. (1996)
5. In these specifications the separability axioms
SER and SET are replaced by the stronger additivity axioms ADBR and ADBT respectively:
ADBR (Additivity Between Degrees of Responsibility)
ADBT (Additivity Between Types)
Moreover, to arrive at his concrete formula, Roemer (1996) strengthens the axiom IAWR
6:
EIAWR (Extreme Inequality Aversion Within Responsibility)
Assume SER. Then , where
is a non-decreasing function.
We can then formulate the following lemma, which is proven in appendix 3.
Lemma1 (Roemer). satisfies WRI,ADBR and EIAWR if andonly if it can be written
as , where and are non-decreasing.
Toarriveathisconcretefunctionalform,Vandegaer(1993)imposesnexttoADBTanadditional
additivity assumption within types. More interesting is the anonimity condition, to which we



































5 Bossert et al. (1996) also give an axiomatisation of the concrete measures following from both approaches. Our
theorem 1 is formulated at a more abstract level.
6 The axiom EIAWR is not really a "strengthening" of IAWR in its strong version, since income transfers above
the minimum will have no effect on the value of . ur[.]-9-
ADWT (Additivity Within Types)
Assume SET. Then
ANT (Anonymity w.r.t. types)
Let be a permutation of {1,...,n}. Let
Then
All these axioms lead to
Lemma 2 (Van de gaer). satisfies WRI, ANT, IABT, ADBT, ADWT if and only if it
can be written as , where are
non-decreasing, and is strictly concave.
The proof of lemma 2 can be found in Appendix 3.
Let us return to the interpretation of ANT. This axiom seems especially plausible in the
between-types approach and if we focus only on the information which is available in Y or in
thetraditional transition matrices. Whywould wetreat children of differentdescent differently













































































of all children and not to discriminate against the children of richer parents
7. But there is an
attractive interpretation in the within-column approach also: why would the evaluation of a
given income level be different for different types if they exert exactly the same effort? It is
therefore useful to note that Roemer’s evaluation function in lemma 1 satisfies ANT iff
.
For the analysis of transition matrices, we will strengthen axiom IABT. This axiom has been
formulated at the level of the evaluated opportunities for the different types. It states that a
"redistributionofopportunities"ispositivelyvaluedbyanethicalobserverwhowantstoequalise
opportunities. This is not sufficient to capture the idea that a redistribution of income from the
better off types to the worse off types is necessarily positively valued: the valuation of such
redistribution will depend on the specific functional form chosen for the v-functions. The
stronger intuition about the desirability of redistribution of outcomes is formalised in the
following axiom IABTY. The formulation of this axiom is somewhat complicated by the fact
thatwehavetokeeptheincomesineachrowrankedinincreasingorder:rememberthedefinition
of Y. The child that receives the transfer is in the -th position before the transfer takes place,
and in the -th position after the transfer, . Similarly, the child that pays for the transfer
is in the -th position before the transfer takes place, and in the -th position after the transfer,
.
IABTY (Inequality Aversion Between Types’ Incomes)









Y ˜ Yv t [ ˜ y t (.)]=v t[y t(.)]" t ¹ k , l ,
˜ y k (b) = yk(a) +e  and ˜ yl(d) = yl(g)-e
˜ yk(r) = yk(r)," r<a  and " r>b ; a<b ˜ y k(r) = yk(r + 1),a£r<b
˜ y l(r) = yl(r)," r<d  and " r>g ; d<g ˜ y l(r) = yl(r - 1),d<r£g
v k[˜ y k(.)]£v l[˜ y l(.)]
S[˜ Y]>S[ Y]
7However, the desirability of such a differential treatment lies at the heart of another approach to mobility: the
dynasticone, asdefendedby Atkinson(1981)andDardanoni(1993). Hereanincome increasefor achild isvalued
less if her parent is richer. The motivation behind this approach is to maximise welfare over the generations and
surely not to equalise opportunities.-11-
The move from IABT to IABTY has important consequences. More specifically, if we impose
nofurtherrestriction on thevaluationfunction andwewantitto satisfy (weak)IABTY together
with SRI, then it has to take a particular form. We can indeed show that
Lemma 3. Assume SET. satisfies SRI, ANT and (weak) IABTY for all increasing
functions ifandonlyifitcanbewrittenas ,where
is the leximin ordering.
The proof of lemma 3 is in Appendix 3. The intuitive reason for the result is that, because of
SRI,thetransferdescribedbyIABTYincreases anddecreases butthattheamounts
with which these valuations change can be arbitrarily big or small if no further restrictions are
imposed on the -function.
Things get even more complicated when we want to apply the IABTY-logic to a framework
with bistochastic matrices of transition. In that case, we will have to restrict further the kind of
transfersdescribedintheIABTY-axiom,tomakesurethatthematrixresultingfromthetransfer
is still bistochastic. More precisely, we have to make sure that the child that "receives" the
transfer and the child that "pays" for the transfer simply swap income classes: after the transfer
the former must end in the income class in which the latter was before the transfer and vice
versa. Hence the transfer has to be equal to . As in the formulation of IABTY, we
consider again the situation where the child that receives the transfer is in the -th position
before the transfer takes place, and in the -th position after the transfer, . Similarly, the
child that pays for the transfer is in the -th position before the transfer takes place, and in the
-th position after the transfer, . We can then reformulate IABTY in the context of
bistochastic matrices as follows:
S[Y]









IABTYBM (Inequality Aversion Between Types’ Incomes applied to Bistochastic
Matrices)





of transition matrices , where is the class of bistochastic transition matrices. The link
between the definitions of P and Y is obvious and has been explained before. The effects of the
transfer described in IABTYBM can then be interpreted in terms of a transformation of the
transitionmatrix. Assuming,withoutlossofgenerality,thatthechildwithaparentfromincome
classkhadanincomeinthej-thclass,andthattheincomeofthechildwithaparentfromincome
class l belonged itself to the h-th class, the transfer will transform the original matrix P into ,
where
3 Social mobility and the intergenerational transition matrix
In general, we define a mobility indexas afunction , where .
Manydifferentmobilityindiceshavebeenproposedinthesociologicalandeconomicliterature.
Some of them are described in Appendix 1. In Table 1 we show their values for a sample of
published empirical transition matrices, which are described in more detail in Appendix 2. No
unambiguousrankingispossibleonthebasisofthesemeasures. Exceptforonemeasure,B(US)
(for the US and taken from Behrman and Taubman, 1985) is the most mobile matrix. It can
also be defended that the transition matrix A(GB), calculated for Great Britain by Atkinson et
al. (1983) is probably the least mobile matrix. But it is not clear how the other matrices should
be ordered.
Y ˜ Yv t [ ˜ y t (.)]=v t[y t(.)]" t ¹ k , l ,
˜ y k (b) = yl(g) and ˜ yl(d) = yk(a)
˜ y k(r) = yk(r)," r<a  and " r>b ; a<b ˜ y k(r) = yk(r + 1),a£r<b
˜ y l(r) = yl(r)," r<d  and " r>g ; d<g ˜ y l(r) = yl(r - 1),d<r£g




˜ p kj = pkj -( 1/ m) ;˜ pkh = pkh +( 1/ m) ;˜ plj = plj +( 1/ m) ;˜ plh = plh -( 1/ m)  and j < h.
M:G®Â : P®M[ P] P=[p ij]ÎG-13-
Table 1 about here
If different measures give different rankings, it becomes important to understand better their
normative implications. Shorrocks (1978) proposed the following axioms which reasonable






If and , then .
Since we will later concentrate on the evaluation of transformations of the matrix P, it is useful
to reformulate SM as:
If can be obtained from P through a finite sequence of MADT, then ,
where MADT is a "movement away from the diagonal transformation", defined as
The first axiom states that the completely immobile transition matrix is the unity matrix. This
axiom is widely accepted and identifies a lower bound for mobility. The next axiom provides
an upper bound. Mobility is maximal if children from all classes have an equal probability to
achieveeachpossibleoutcome. Thethirdaxiomcapturesthefollowingintuition:iftheelements
on the diagonal of are smaller than those on the diagonal of P, then there is more movement
betweenincomeclassesin thaninP,andtherefore shouldbelargerthan . Clearly,
SM implies I.




n ii¢. Then "P ÎG¹P
M: M[ P
M]>M[ P]
˜ p ij ³ pij"i ¹ j $˜ pij > pij M[˜ P]>M[ P]
˜ PM [ ˜ P ]>M[ P]
˜ p ij = pij +e ;˜ pji = pji+e ;˜ pii = pii -e ;˜ pjj = pjj -e ( e>0)
˜ P
˜ PM [ ˜ P ] M [ P ]
8 I is the identity matrix, is a vector with all elements equal to 1. i-14-
All these axioms look very plausible. However, Shorrocks (1978) has drawn attention to the
basic conflict between SM and PM. For later reference we will summarize this result as
Shorrocks (1978) impossibility theorem. SM and PM are incompatible.
The basic conflict between these two axioms urges us to reflect more about the basic reasons
tobeinterestedinintergenerationalmobilityandontherelationshipbetweenthesebasicreasons
and the exact formulation of the axioms. Shorrocks (1978, p. 1016) interprets his result as
reflecting a conflict between mobility as movement (captured by SM) and mobility as lack of
predictability (captured by PM). We see a more basic conflict between mobility as movement
and mobility as a means to equalize opportunities. The axiom SM fits perfectly into the former
interpretation, but PM does not. It is not straightforward at all that equal rows of the transition
matrixwouldreflectmaximalmovement. CompareP
MandBinthefollowingtwo-classexample:
It can be argued that there is much more movement with the matrix B. On the other hand, PM
is exactly in line with the equal opportunity ideas in the previous section in both interpretations
(as described in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2): P
M is the best possible matrix because it incorporates
acompletelyequaldistribution ofopportunities. ButwhatthenaboutSM? What iswrong with
thebasicintuitionthatmoremovementleadstomoreequalopportunities? Togetabetterinsight
into this problem, we concentrate on the axioms ANT and IABTYBM.
Anonymity Between Types
ANT can easily be reformulated for the analysis of transition matrices:
ANT* (Anonymity Between Types)
Let beany matrixobtained fromP by permuting rows of P. Then .






















E[P] M[E[P]] = M[P]-15-
Theorem 2. SM and ANT* are incompatible.
Proof: Consider the mobility matrix
The value of the mobility index for can now be written as . By SM, M[2/3] > M[1/3].
By ANT*, M[2/3] = M[1/3].




Let be any matrix obtained out of I by permuting rows. Then .
ThisimpliesthatthematrixB,introducedbefore,has"minimalmobility",becausethepositions
of all children are perfectly predictable. On the other hand, we argued already that it can be
seen to represent maximal movement.
Inequality aversion between types
In the traditional literature on intergenerational mobility, much attention has been devoted to
caseswhere onerow of P stochasticallydominates another. We therefore define forany matrix
: . Rowj ofmatrixPstochasticallydominatesrow l
if with at least one inequality strict. In some cases the domain of
transition matrices has been restricted to , the set of so-called monotone matrices (see, e.g.,
















p t , i ( t= 1 , ..,n;r = 1,¼,n) PÎG
C j,r£C l,r " r=1 ,¼,n
D
D={ P|C i+1 ,r£C i,r" r=1 ,¼,n and "i = 1,¼,n-1}-16-
A monotone matrix is a matrix where each row is stochastically dominated by the row below
9.
The concentration on this form of stochastic dominance is an indication of the fact that the
literatureonintergenerationalmobilitymeasurementfocusesontherowsratherthanthecolumns
of P and is therefore closer in spirit to the IABT-approach of Lemma 2 than to Roemer’s
IAWR-approachofLemma1. Wewillthereforealsofocusontheformer. Inthisbetween-types
frameworkthe stochasticdominance of row j over row l immediately impliesthat children with
aparentinclassjhavebetteropportunitiesthanchildrenwithaparentinclasslforallmonotonic
v-functions.
The desirability of equalising opportunities between types has been represented in the previous
sectionbytheaxiomIABTYBM. Combiningthisaxiomwiththeideaofstochasticdominance,
we can reformulate it easily in terms of transformations of the transition matrices:
DEOT (Desirability of Equalising Opportunity Transformations)
If can be obtained from P through a finite sequence of EOT, then , where
EOT is an "equalising opportunity transformation", defined as
(with at least one of the latter inequalities strict)
AcomparisonbetweenthedefinitionofMADTinthereformulatedaxiomSMandthedefinition
of EOT immediately shows
Theorem 3. SM and DEOT are incompatible.
Theinterpretation ofthetheorem is revealing. Ifwe interpretsocial mobilityas movement,any
movement between income classes will increase mobility and it is reasonable to impose SM.
˜ PM [ ˜ P ]>M[ P]
˜ p ij = pij -e ;˜ pik = pik +e ;˜ plj = plj +e ;˜ plk = plk -e e>0, j<k,
˜ Ci,r³ ˜ Cl,r " r=1,¼,n
9It has been argued that most empirical transition matrices areclose to monotonicity. But the property isfar from
universal. If we look at the matrices described in Appendix 2, three of them are not monotonous: those given by
Atkinson et al. (1983) for GB, by Rustichini et al. (1996) for Italy, and by Behrman and Taubman (1985) for the
USA. In this last case the violations of monotonicity are particularly severe. This is mainly due to the fact that it
is a large (decile) matrix: of course, distinguishing more groups will lead to more deviations from monotonicity.
Ifeach individualwould beputintoacellofhis own,thematrixwould onlybemonotonousiftheintergenerational
process does not allow any reranking.-17-
However, if we areinterested in social mobility as ameans to equalize economic opportunities,
onlyan"equalising"movement(asdefinedbyEOT)willincreaseourmobilitymeasure. Another
wayofinterpreting thesame findingisto notethat MADT-transformations areasubclass ofthe
class of transformations defined in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and that therefore the
following axiom is a straightforward extension of SM:
PCP (Preference for Children of the Poor)
If can be obtained from P through a finite sequence of ABT, then , where
ABT is an "Atkinson-Bourguignon-transformation", defined as
Given the interpretation of the transformations it is obvious that PCP implies SM, but not vice
versa. The conflict between PCP and DEOT is obvious. Both transform the matrix P in the
sameway, buttheyhave adifferentcondition on therowswherethetransformationtakes place.
ByPCPalltransfersofopportunitiesfromchildrenofrichertochildrenofpoorerparentsincrease
mobility. AccordingtoDEOTatransformationisdesirable onlyifit isin favorofchildren with
worse opportunities. A transformation in favour of the children of poor parents at the expense
of children with rich parents will only equalise opportunities, if the latter group had better
opportunitiesbeforethetransformation. ThissuggeststhattheconflictbetweenPCPandDEOT
(andhencebetweenSMandDEOT)willdisappearifwerestrictthedomainoftransitionmatrices
to : on that domain children of poorer parents will always have poorer opportunities.
On there is no longer a conflict between SM and DEOT because any MADT (and even any
ABT) will be equalising. Nor is there a conflict between ANT* and SM:in fact, the anonymity
axiom cannot be meaningfully applied on the domain since any permutation of the rows of
will yield a new mobility matrix outside . It then stands to reason that the
Shorrocks-conflict between SM and PM also will disappear for mobility matrices in :
Lemma 4. SM and PM are compatible on .
˜ PM [ ˜ P ]>M[ P]







However, we do not feel that domain restrictions are an adequate answer to a conflict between
different attractive axioms
10. It may be true that non-monotone matrices are rare, but typically
our sharpest intuitions involve the comparison of extreme cases. The exceptional character of
the cases is not in itself a reason to throw the intuitions overboard. On the contrary, they show
clearlytheimplicationsof thechoiceofaspecific mobilitymeasure. Inthiscasethere isabasic
conflict between two approaches to social mobility: on the one hand mobility as movement, on
the other hand mobility as more equal opportunities. In the former approach axiom SM is
perfectly meaningful but PM is not. In the latter approach, PM seems crucial, but SM does not
make too much sense. On the other hand, ANT* and DEOT (for the between-types approach)
seem indispensable for a measure of equality of opportunities.
Let us therefore now take a look at the different mobility indices proposed in the statistical and
sociological literature, some of which were already introduced in Table 1. Which mobility
measures satisfy which axioms?
11 The details of definitions and derivations can be found in
Appendix1. Table2givesanoverviewoftheresults. Fromthisextensive,thoughnotexhaustive
overview, we can conclude that all measures satisfy I, some satisfy SM, few satisfy PM and
ANT* and none satisfies DEOT. To measure "mobility as movement" there is some choice:
many measures satisfy SM. For those who want to analyse transition matrices from the point
of view of equal opportunities, however, the existing literature does not contain an attractive
index. The best choice seems to be andfor obvious reasons: it depends directly upon the
deviation of P from . However does not satisfy DEOT.
Table 2 about here
This negative result is not really surprising since the literature has focused on mobility as




10 To resolve the conflict between PM and SM, Shorrocks (1978) also suggests to "exclude those matrices which,
by any stretch of the imagination, are unlikely to arise in practice". He therefore concentrates on matrices with a
quasi-maximal diagonal and shows that PM and SM are no longer incompatible for this class of matrices. P has
a quasi-maximal diagonal when there exist positive such that .
11 See Shorrocks (1993) for a similar exercise.
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because they would like to see more equal opportunities. This basic link between "concern for
equalityof opportunities" and "intergenerationalmobility" is not capturedby anyof the current
indices. Therefore,thosewholookattransitionmatricesfromthispointofviewcanbeseriously
misguided if they use any of the existing indices. In the next section we will illustrate how the
insightsfrom section 2lead directly to some easy measuresof "equality of opportunities"in the
context of transition matrices.
4 Evaluation of transition matrices in terms of equality of opportunities
Application of the results of Lemmas 1 and 2 to transition matrices will yield immediately an
operational criterion if we are willing to choose specific functional forms. We suggest some
specific choices in section 4.1. In section 4.2 we illustrate how our proposed indices work for
the evaluation of the empirical matrices from Table 1 and Appendix 2.
4.1 A concrete proposal
Let us first look at Roemer’s proposal in Lemma 1. We argued already that there are good
reasons to impose ANT in the within-column approach too, i.e. to impose .
We further assume that the evaluation function is not dependent on . This is less restrictive
than it may seem at first sight. Since we identify the level of effort on the basis of the income
level reached (the higher the income level, the larger the effort), the effect of differences in
effort is indistinguishable from the effect of income and can therefore be captured by the
specification of the valuation function. Bringing these assumptions together we write
where is increasing and concave. The well known iso-elastic specification is an obvious
choice for . If we work with a transition matrix the m effort-levels can be operationalised
as the percentiles of the income distributions of the different types. Denoting these percentiles
by z, we get
















where stands for evaluation function according to Roemer (focusing on degree of
Responsibility).
The alternative proposal in Lemma 2 focuses on the evaluation of the rows. Again assuming
that the effect of effort differences is conflated with the effect of income differences, the
evaluation function from Lemma 2 reduces to
or, applied to transition matrices,
where stands for evaluation function focusing on the opportunities of different Types. The
income is the income of the j-th quantile in the income distribution of the children. Again
wecouldusetheiso-elasticformforthefunctions and . Aspecialcasewithextremeinequality
aversion is
where is the leximin-ordering.
Figure 2 helps clarifying the interpretation of these valuation functions with a three-group
example. The upper part of the figure shows what can be called the opportunity set of a given
type i. Cumulative frequencies are put on the horizontal axis. They represent the effort level.
Theverticalaxisgivestheevaluationoftheincomesofthethreequantiles:thespecificnumbers
will depend on the specification of . The shaded area gives the surface of the opportunity set
of type i. It is now clear how to interpret : it is the sum of concave transformations of these
surfaces. If we choose , the ranking of social states will be based only on the surface of the














































opportunity sets of the different types, but instead takes the intersection of all the sets
12. This
isillustrated in thelower partofFigure 2,wherewehavebrought togethertwo opportunitysets:
the heavy line is the intersection as measured by .
Figure 2 about here
It is important to realise that the measurement of opportunities requires more than just the
information in the transition matrix. Both for and for we also need information about the
income levels of the different quantiles. This is immediately obvious from Figure 2, but the
intuition can perhaps be strengthened by considering a specific example. Suppose we have to
compare two situations with the same transition matrix: assume it is the identity matrix in both
cases. Now suppose that in the first situation the income levels associated with the different
quantiles for the children are very wide apart, while in the second situation these income levels
are virtually the same. Then, although the transition matrices are identical, it is obvious that
opportunities are more unequally distributed in the first than in the second situation.
Figure 2 reveals another interesting insight: and coincide on the domain of monotone
transitionmatrices. Indeed,on ,thesmallestopportunitysetisatthesametimetheintersection
of all the opportunity sets. We noted already that monotonicity is a far from universal
characteristic of transition matrices, however.
What we have proposed until now is the general specification of a social evaluation function
embodyingamongotherthingsthemonotonicityconditionWRI(orSRI). Oncewehavechosen
specific functional forms for the functions in and , and for in , we can derive
from this social valuation function a measure of "inequality of opportunities" by the usual
procedure of defining an equally distributed equivalent measure of opportunities. In the next
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12 The interpretation of in terms of the surface of the opportunity sets and of as the intersection of the
opportunity sets is due to Marc Fleurbaey.
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4.2 An empirical example
To implement , we choose the iso-elastic specification for and for , resulting in
where
Wewrite"averageopportunities"as andusing(1)wedefinethe"equallydistributed
equivalent" level of opportunities implicitly by
Bringing all these elements together, we compute an "index of inequality of opportunities" as
We can then rank different situations on the basis of
where we see the usual decomposition in a "level" component (average opportunities) and an
"inequality component".
While proportional changes in the income vector keep the within-row (ethically justified)
inequality constant, and proportional changes in opportunities keep constant, the effect of
proportional changes in incomes on is less transparent. To avoid complications with

















































such that the opportunities of type i are given simply by the average income for the children of
that type. This makes invariant for proportional changes in all incomes. This also allows
us to normalise the opportunities so that the value for the children of the poorest type is equal
to1. Following thisprocedure we getthevalues in Table 3 fortheopportunities of thequartiles
in those transition matrices for which we could compute the marginal distributions (see
Appendix 2). Of course the methods used for the construction of these mobility matrices are
not always comparable and we have made some extremely strong assumptions to get at the
numbers in Table 3. The present analyis is only meant to be illustrative.
Table 3 about here
From Table 3 it is evident that opportunities are most equally distributed in Italy. This is
confirmedintheupperpartofFigure3,wherewecomparethevaluesof fordifferentvalues
of . Using equation (3)it can becalculated that forhigh values of , eliminating all inequality
of opportunitywould beequivalent to anincrease in average opportunities of 13.6% in the U.S.
( =0.12) and of 4.4% in Italy ( =0.042). Comparison is not always that straightforward,
as the comparison of D(GB) and Z(US) in the lower part of Figure 3 shows. For low values of
, opportunities in Britain are more unequally distributed than in the U.S. For high values, the
picturechanges. ThisreflectsofcoursethepatterninTable3:as increases,thelargerinequality
at the bottom end of the US distribution becomes more and more important for the value of the
inequality index. It is worthwhile comparing these results with the rankings obtained with the
traditionalmobilityindices(Table1). Itturnsoutthatintegratinginformationaboutthemarginal
distributions in the evaluative exercise and specifying equality of opportunity in a consistent
way have important consequences for the results.













ofopportunity forchildren ofdifferent descent. Researchers that areinterestedin anevaluation
of matrices of transition from this perspective have to be careful in at least two respects. First,
the mobility measures proposed in the literature are not attractive to measure equality of
opportunity. Axioms like Shorrocks’ monotonicity condition may capture in an adequate way
the idea of mobility as movement, but their relevance for the measurement of equality of
opportunity is restricted to the class of monotone transition matrices. Secondly, the transition
matrixinitselfdoesnotcontainsufficientinformationtoobtainacompleterankingofalternative
states of the world. Just like in the Atkinson (1981) framework, we also need information on
the marginal distribution of the incomes of both generations.
Recent developments in the theory of equal opportunities suggest two alternative approaches
to measure the degree of equality of opportunities captured in a transition matrix. One starts
fromRoemer(1996)’s ideato aim for equalincomes forall children atthesame effortleveland
concentrates on the columns of the transition matrix. The other one elaborates Van de gaer
(1993)’sideatomeasurethe"opportunities"ofchildrenofdifferentdescentbyusinginformation
from the rows of that matrix. Both approaches are basically incompatible but both capture
important intuitions concerning equality of opportunity and can be easily operationalised. We
have illustrated this with some empirical examples.
Ourapproachunderlinestheneedtothinkcarefullyaboutthenormativeimplicationsofdifferent
mobility measures. The theory of equal opportunities offers a promising starting point for the
development of new and interesting tools for policy analysis. More work is needed to get a
better insight into the empirical and theoretical implications of these new tools in an
intergenerational context.-25-
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Appendix 2: Empirical Implementation
The following table provides a short description of the mobility matrices used in the























































































I: the year the interview was taken
B: the year of birth
Few studies report information on the marginal distributions of fathers’ or sons’
incomes.  A notable exception is Rustichini et al (1996).  We used his data to fit a
lognormal distribution of incomes.  Due to the fact that his data are based on median
occupational incomes, we get an underestimation of inequality.  Atkinson (1983) also
provides some information on the distribution of hourly earnings in Great Britain. We
used his data to fit a lognormal distribution of  hourly earnings for Great Britain.
Rustichini et al. (1996)’s article contains 8 points of the distribution of their index
(octiles) of occupational incomes.  These incomes were normalised such that the
minimal value of occupational income equals 100.  The estimation procedure fits a
cumulative lognormal distribution with origin equal to 100 to these eight data points.
The parameter values of the lognormal distribution are those which minimize the sum
of squared residuals.  In the present context, this is not a maximum likelihood
procedure, but a distance minimization procedure.  The same procedure was applied to                                                                A- 8
Lemma 3
IABTY compares income vectors which are such that
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] v y v y t t t t
~
. . =   " „ t k l ,
AND  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] v y v y v y v y k k k k l l l l . . . .
~ ~ < £ < , where the strict inequalities
follow from SRI.
Then, IABTY says that these vectors are to be preferred.
This implies that we also prefer vectors which are such that
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] v y v y t t t t
~
. . =   " „ t k l ,  AND  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] v y v y v y v y k k k k l l l l . . . .
~ ~ < < <
To prove Lemma 3, we now apply Sen’s Leximin Derivation Theorem (Sen, 1986,
p.1119).  This theorem is applied in three steps:
(a) SRI+IABTY￿HE
Following Sen (1986, p.1116) HE, Hammond's Equity can be formally defined
as follows:
Let X be the set of alternative social states and H the set of individuals.
For any x y X , ˛ , if some pair g h H , ˛ ,  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] U y U x U x U y g g h h > > >  and
[ ] [ ] " „ = i g h U x U y i i , , , then xRy
(note: we have 'implied' but not 'equivalent to' because of the strong inequality
sign in the middle, and xRy in stead of xPy.)
(b) We also have that SRI ￿ P (Strong Pareto)
Following Sen (1986, p.1115, fn 61), P can be defined as:
[ ] " ˛ " $ ￿ x y X i xR y i xPy xPy i i , , : & :  and [ ] " ￿ i xI y xIy i :
(note: it is here that SRI is needed in stead of WRI)
(c) In addition, ANT￿A (Anonimity)
Following Sen (1986, p.1116), A can be defined as:
If { } Ui is a re-ordering (permutation) of { } Ui
* , then  { } [ ] { } [ ] F U F U i i =
*
Therefore, SET+SRI+IABTY+ANT￿HE+P+A.  The proof is completed by noting
that Sen’s Leximin Derivation Theorem establishes the equivalence between HE+P+A
and Leximin.Table 1. Social mobility in some published transition matrices
A (GB) 0.608 0.826 0.865 0.522 0.661 0.282 0.883
D (GB) 0.606 0.862 0.950 0.707 0.646 0.317 0.859
B (US) 0.850 0.970 0.943 0.721 0.873 0.331 0.971
Z (US) 0.665 0.870 0.947 0.710 0.652 0.314 0.856
R (US) 0.670 0.881 0.943 0.710 0.661 0.319 0.887
R (It) 0.660 0.920 0.918 0.684 0.690 0.328 0.904
See appendix 1 for the definition of the mobility indices and appendix 2 for information
concerning the transition matrices.
Ml Mt Md Mf Ml MB Mm
B-1Table 2. Axiomatic analysis of mobility measures
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B-2Table 3. Opportunities of children in some published transition matrices
Children of Children of Children of Children of
bottom 25-50 50-75 top
Z (US) 1.000 1.160 1.322 1.360
R (US) 1.000 1.033 1.188 1.378
R (It) 1.000 1.000 1.053 1.156
D (GB) 1.000 1.020 1.086 1.441
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